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The period known as the “War on Terror” has prompted a revival of interest in the problem 
of “dirty hands”: the idea that political actors frequently confront choices where they 
cannot fulfill their responsibilities to the public welfare without violating ordinary moral 
obligations to avoid violence, deception, and similar forms of wrongdoing (Walzer 1973). 
Several motifs from the dirty hands literature have migrated into public discourse: in 
particular, the image of the anguished public leader committed to protect the public’s safety 
but seemingly forced into distasteful acts of violence to achieve this noble end. This 
renewed interest is hardly surprising, given that the September 11th attacks led 
policymakers anxious to prevent another attack into a reconsideration of just the kinds of 
morally troubling tactics that the literature about dirty hands addresses. Popular news 
stories regularly characterize President Obama as personally wrestling with the insoluble 
moral dilemmas inherent in “the president’s attempt to apply the ‘just war’ theories of 
Christian philosophers to a brutal modern conflict,” yet ultimately resolving these conflicts 
in favor of the more aggressive course of action (Becker and Shane 2012).  
It is easy to understand why the notion of dirty hands appeals to political actors 
concerned with polishing the president’s image. More surprising, however, some political 
theorists have begun adopting a similar interpretation of contemporary targeted killing 
policies. Notable in this regard is political theorist Stephen de Wijze (2009), who contends 
that a policy of using preventive (lethal) force against terrorist actors is (under specified but 
not uncommon circumstances) an instance of a dirty-handed moral dilemma (see also Kaag 
and Kreps 2014, 11-14). The identification of the practice of targeted killing with the 
problem of dirty hands carries far-reaching implications that are morally problematic and, 
we argue, reveal the dangers with such an approach.  
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In the first two sections of this chapter we argue that, while dirty hands situations 
exist as a persistent problem of political life, it is a mistake to classify current policies of 
targeted killing as an example of dirty hands. Instead, as we argue in the third section, if 
these policies are to be justified at all, they must meet the more exacting standards of either 
the just war ethic or the law enforcement ethic, in particular the requirement (with limited 
and defined exceptions) that noncombatants be immune from violence. In the fourth 
section, we review a proposal by Michael Walzer that a third, “in-between” ethic is needed 
to accommodate a gap between the circumstances under which the just war and law 
enforcement ethics apply, and conclude that it is unnecessary and potentially undermines 
existing traditions and law in place to restrain force. The chapter’s fifth section argues that 
the concept of dirty hands can prove insightful for moral analysis of some targeted killing 
scenarios, but that applying it to ongoing, established policies, rather than specific 
emergencies, opens the door to predictable appropriations of the concept to domains it was 
never intended to address. In the sixth section, we examine the ethical problems of 
accountability associated with using drones or unmanned aerial vehicles for targeted killing 
(we opt for the more commonly used term “drone”). In the conclusion, we suggest some 
implications from the case of targeted killing in assessing the relationship of the dirty hands 
literature to the ethics of war more generally.  
Dirty Hands  
In his article “Targeted Killing: A ‘Dirty Hands’ Analysis,” Stephen de Wijze argues that a 
policy of targeted killing “can indeed be justified” under certain circumstances, but 
nevertheless “also remains morally wrong and leaves a moral remainder that pollutes those 
who authorize, plan and execute it,” a status he classifies as a “dirty hands action” (de 
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Wijze 2009, 308). De Wijze’s underlying motivation in advancing this argument appears to 
be laudable. By appropriating the language of dirty hands, with its implication of a residue 
of moral pollution, he denies that those participating in targeted killings can wholly escape 
moral blame. His adoption of the dirty hands framework permits him to argue that some 
dimension of targeted killing remains ineliminably wrong, and consequently that “a policy 
of [targeted killing] must be adopted only with the greatest reluctance and as rarely as 
possible” (de Wijze 2009, 318). Important aspects of de Wijze’s use of the dirty hands 
framework do seem valid. Some features of the moral quandary faced by government 
officials result from “the immoral and evil acts (or projects)” of the terrorist organizations 
themselves: their unwillingness to engage in conventional struggle (precluding their easy 
identification as combatants) and targeting of innocent civilians in peaceful contexts 
(making the imminence of the threat posed difficult to ascertain) (de Wijze 2005, 456, 464; 
de Wijze 2009, 309-10). Yet his central claim, that the idea of dirty hands is an appropriate 
description for the ongoing practice of targeted killing, is problematic. 
De Wijze’s argument that the practice of targeted killing qualifies as an example of 
dirty hands does not explain the specific moral principles violated by the practice. Instead, 
his analysis focuses on the regret and moral anguish that those engaged in targeted killings 
should experience. While these factors are often by-products of dirty-handed choices, they 
are not by themselves constitutive of what gives such choices their distinctive moral 
ambiguity. If regret and anguish were the only distinguishing aspects of dirty hands, the 
morally legitimate use of lethal force for self-defense in war or law enforcement would 
qualify as a dirty-handed action whenever the individual carrying out the killing felt moral 
anguish afterward. There may be good reason to desire that soldiers and law enforcement 
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officers experience anguish over the use of lethal force, but classifying all who feel anguish 
as actors with dirty hands renders the concept overly broad and robs it of its specific 
explanatory power.  
What makes the concept of dirty hands distinctive is its identification of a specific 
moral conflict between two real yet incompatible moral values or obligations, where no 
available action enables the agent to avoid violating a deeply held moral principle. In such 
circumstances, the necessity of choosing one of the available actions, and the correlative 
necessity of violating a contrary but still valid moral principle, generates what Bernard 
Williams termed a “remainder” of moral wrong incommensurable with, and therefore not 
wholly made up for by, the good vindicated by the choice (Williams 1973). Not all 
instances of moral conflict rise to this level of complexity. In some cases, moral conflict 
may exist without yielding a particular ethical remainder: the violation of the moral 
principle is present, but is internally justified by moral values commensurable with those 
being compromised. For instance, in seeking to pass the 13th Amendment to the 
Constitution abolishing slavery, Abraham Lincoln arranged for wavering Democrats to be 
promised government jobs and other favors in exchange for their votes, and concealed this 
fact from public view on the grounds that it might scuttle the Amendment. Despite the 
dubious nature of these actions, Lincoln could argue that the exclusionary impact of slavery 
(among its other harms) undermined democracy, and that the degree of prima facie 
corruption involved in his side deals were internally justified—fully made up for—by the 
same values they compromised (Parrish 2010, 70-71). In other words, such forms of moral 
conflict really constitute cases of prima facie obligations being over-ridden by competing 
moral considerations of greater force. 
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Dirty-handed actions, however, go further than this. They signify a real difference 
in kind between the competing moral values at stake—an inability to resolve the conflict by 
appeal to a common moral standard. In the true dirty hands situation, whatever one does, 
there is a morally significant remainder to be accounted for: the moral principle violated is 
incommensurable with the competing moral principle that motivates the violation, such that 
the wrong caused by the one cannot be made up for by the good of the other. This degree of 
moral conflict may not rise to the level of a truly tragic dilemma involving such brutal 
alternatives that there exists no discernable best action (as we arguably find in Sartre’s 
dilemma of the soldier who must either forsake the resistance or abandon his ailing mother) 
(Sartre 2007). But even when we can say with reasonable assurance that our choice is the 
best possible one given the circumstances, there remains, where dirty hands exist, a real 
wrong for which we are accountable. 
The problem with de Wijze’s analysis of targeted killing is vagueness: he does not 
specify precisely which aspects of moral conflict make it an instance of dirty hands. He 
distinguishes targeted killing from forms of political assassination (aimed at civilian leaders 
to promote regime change or other political gains), and instead defines targeted killing as 
the killing of individuals who: (1) pose an “imminent threat”; (2) have “a proven record of 
actively planning and/or executing terrorist attacks against civilians” as well as a 
perceptible intention to continue to do so; and (3) present officials with “no realistic 
possibility of preventing such attacks by nonlethal methods and bringing the perpetrators 
before a proper court of law” (de Wijze 2009, 307-08). These broad criteria encompass a 
host of actions that seem to be distinct from each other in morally significant ways. For 
example, a law enforcement officer who kills a terrorist driving a vehicle laden with 
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explosives toward a crowded building of civilians meets each of de Wijze’s separate 
criteria: it is the killing of an individual posing an imminent threat, with a clear intent to 
harm civilians, where nonlethal means are not feasible for stopping the threat. Yet we 
recognize this case as a paradigm example of the legitimate use of force within a domestic 
law enforcement context. This example differs importantly from de Wijze’s sustained case 
study in his article, the Israeli military’s targeted killing of Hamas leader Salah Shehada, 
which resulted in 14 civilian fatalities (de Wijze 2009, 310-17). According to de Wijze, any 
targeted killing meeting his criteria defining this practice should count as an instance of 
dirty hands. But as these two examples show, key morally relevant features of a targeted 
killing—such as whether it results in noncombatant casualties—offer a basis for 
differentiating between alternative categories of targeted killings: some legitimate, some 
morally questionable, and some morally blameworthy. By ignoring key features for 
evaluating these distinct cases, de Wijze mistakenly collapses many varieties of this 
practice under the general category of dirty-handed dilemmas.  
Emergency Ethics 
In contrast to de Wijze’s approach, we believe the best way to understand the concept of 
dirty hands is as a dilemma that characteristically arises in emergency situations that are 
difficult to foresee and plan for. A promising place to explore this connection is the thought 
of Michael Walzer, since he has repeatedly addressed (with varying degrees of directness) 
the relationship between dirty hands and emergency ethics. In his influential treatment of 
just war theory, Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer does not appeal directly to the idea of dirty 
hands, but approaches closest to it in his chapter on “Supreme Emergency.” Walzer argues 
that situations combining an imminent threat with enormously consequential stakes—no 
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mere danger, but catastrophe “of an unusual and horrifying kind”—may create a situation 
of “supreme emergency” in which “one might well be required to override the rights of 
innocent people and shatter the war convention” (2000, 259). Walzer illustrates the kind of 
scenario he has in mind by reference to Britain’s decision to bomb German cities in 1940, 
when Britain teetered on the edge of defeat at the hands of the Nazis, fulfilling both the 
criteria of imminence (defeat was at hand) and outsized consequences (not just defeat, but 
surrendering to the inhumanity of the Nazi system). He contrasts this situation, where the 
emergency does seem genuinely supreme, with Britain’s decisions to bomb German cities 
later in the war (when British defeat was no longer a realistic possibility) and the American 
decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki (where a negotiated peace might have been had 
if the Allies had not demanded unconditional surrender by Japan). In a later essay 
“Emergency Ethics,” Walzer explicitly identifies a supreme emergency in war as a specific 
instance of the problem of dirty hands (2004). 
Some commentators, notably C.A.J. Coady, have puzzled over an apparent shift in 
Walzer’s thinking on dirty hands, noting that his original characterization in “Political 
Action” included such seemingly mundane cases as campaign finance corruption, which 
could never approach the degree of justificatory burden he establishes for a supreme 
emergency. Coady notes that in “Political Action” Walzer’s argument “seemed much 
closer to a utilitarianism of extremity with the extreme being nowhere near the limit set by 
supreme emergency,” since even in his most dramatic illustration, the ticking-bomb case, 
the stakes, while high, amounted to the lives of at most a few hundred innocents, not the 
survival of a free way of life (2008, 84-85; see also 2014). In “Emergency Ethics,” 
however, Walzer repeatedly invokes the image of dirty hands in describing the moral status 
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of the person who authorizes mass murder of noncombatants in a supreme emergency 
(2004, 37, 45-46, 48). Coady suggests this represents a change in Walzer’s view, 
substantially narrowing the scope and raising the stakes for when dirty hands justifications 
are valid. 
We believe this alleged shift is better explained by interpreting Walzer’s supreme 
emergency as an instance of dirty hands, but not the only instance. Bombing cities is one 
possible kind of dirty-handed action, presumably at the farthest extreme of justificatory 
burden, with bribing a local boss to win an election being another instance closer to our 
regular experience. Walzer does suggest different thresholds for invoking dirty hands in 
each of these cases, but not because his view about the broad category has shifted. It is 
more likely that the differing thresholds reflect a divergence in the harm contemplated (one 
needs a better justification for bombing a city than for a bribe). Admittedly, Walzer 
contributes to the ambiguity, in particular his statement that “dirty hands aren’t permissible 
(or necessary) when anything less than the ongoingness of the community is at stake, or 
when the danger that we face is anything less than communal death” (2004, 46). On closer 
examination, however, Walzer’s actual point appears to be that the form of the problem of 
dirty hands that typically arises in cases of war—namely, violating the just war protections 
for noncombatants—requires a higher threshold to be reached. This claim is fully 
consistent with the possibility (indeed, likelihood) that a lower standard is required for the 
commission of lesser evils.    
Thus Walzer’s considered view appears to be that the deliberate killing of 
noncombatants as a direct instrumental means to one’s end (as opposed to a foreseen but 
not directly intended side-effect) requires the highest conceivable standard of 
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justification—a supreme emergency. This standard is higher than other varieties of dirty 
hands, such as bribery or torture (though Walzer still requires a compelling justification in 
these cases, too). For the remaining cases, we have what Walzer calls “the war 
convention”—that is, the traditional rules of jus in bello,1 including the requirement of 
proportional force and the principle of noncombatant immunity. Drawing this distinction 
between dirty hands broadly understood and emergency ethics more narrowly construed 
allows us to note the crucial point of contrast between Walzer’s view of dirty hands and de 
Wijze’s: Walzer explicitly rules out the idea that the dramatic action demanded by an 
emergency could ever become the normal state of affairs, or that a dirty-handed action 
could ever become an ongoing policy.  
The very nature of Walzer’s concept of supreme emergency implicitly confines its 
applicability to a temporally limited context. “Even in wars where the stakes are very 
high,” Walzer cautions, “they may not be so high at every moment in the course of the war 
as to bring the supreme-emergency argument into play. Each moment is a moment-in-itself; 
we make judgments again and again, not once for each war” (2004, 46). Most importantly, 
this caveat means that emergency ethics (the form of dirty hands associated with taking 
human life) cannot ever be permitted to become rationalized, bureaucratized, made a matter 
of habit: “We must resist the routinization of emergency, reminding ourselves again and 
again that the threats we force others to live with, and live with ourselves, are immoral 																																																								
1 Jus in bello refers to the system of ethical requirements pertaining to the conduct of war 
(such as proportionality and non-combatant immunity), distinguished from the ethical 
requirements of jus ad bellum pertaining to the decision to go to war (such as just cause and 
last resort). See Walzer 2000, 21-50. 
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threats…. This is the essential feature of emergency ethics: that we recognize at the same 
time the evil we oppose and the evil we do, and that we set ourselves, so far as possible, 
against both” (2004, 49). Dirty hands is thus the wrong terminology to use to describe an 
ongoing policy that provides for the intentional taking of life under specified and 
predictably recurring conditions. Rather, that is what the principles governing the use of 
force in law enforcement and just war are for: to mark out the limits within which the 
necessary evil of killing can and cannot be justifiably pursued. 
Walzer clearly intends his conception of dirty hands (and the related topic of 
emergency ethics) as a distinct category from the ordinary actions a soldier or domestic law 
enforcement officer takes in accordance with the conventions governing force in the 
spheres of war and peace, respectively. This distinction does not imply that there is no 
relation between dirty hands and the violence associated with war or law enforcement. War 
in particular, writ large, may at bottom constitute a kind of dirty-handed dilemma, an awful 
necessity posed by the nature of violence and public order.2 Similarly, the overall choice to 
enter into a specific war, particularly a non-defensive war, might frequently meet many of 
the criteria for a dirty-handed dilemma. But within the context of a specific war, if the rules 
of conduct associated with war have any meaning at all, they claim to mark out territory 
within which soldiers may follow their directives with moral safety, knowing that actions 
taken in accord with both their spirit and letter will be internally justifiable moral actions 
(see Parrish 2010, 70-71).  																																																								
2 A view along these lines seems to be present in Augustine’s just war theory, and more 
recent echoes are perceptible in Max Weber’s political theory. See Parrish 2007, 95-101, 
and Weber 1958, 122-28. 
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Just War and Law Enforcement 
The previous sections point out the problem with applying the concept of dirty hands too 
easily to an area such as war for which there is already a well-developed body of ethical 
theory to assess its practices. The concept of dirty hands describes moral conflict at the 
margins, where we experience friction between spheres of value in unexpected and 
uncooperative ways. Just war theory, however, expects moral conflict in its midst. It begins 
with a recurring experience of moral conflict, the kind arising in war, and purports to map 
out the terrain so that soldiers and commanders may each follow a path with relative ethical 
safety. Perhaps just war theory is wrong to assume that such a mapping is possible 
(McMahan 2009), but this is undoubtedly what the theory supposes itself to be doing.   
In this sense, just war theory describes the ethical dimension of a practice— 
soldiering and commanding in war—that is of ongoing relevance to a regrettable sphere of 
human life. In the domestic context, a similar practice exists—law enforcement—and it too 
is guided by an ethical theory. We will call these theories the just war ethic (JWE) and law 
enforcement ethic (LEE), respectively. For both these areas, the ethical theories in question 
offer themselves as a basis for guiding the practices they circumscribe along morally 
permissible paths. If the practice itself is morally justified and the ethic properly describes 
the normative permissions and prohibitions that apply systematically within the practice, 
then the practitioner—the soldier, the police officer—may refer directly to the practice’s 
ethic with confidence, without needing in ordinary circumstances to go beyond it. As John 
Rawls argues in his essay “Two Concepts of Rules,” prescriptions that arise within a 
morally justified practice can claim a kind of day-to-day insulation from the broader “all-
things-considered” judgments that grander ethical theories—such as consequentialism and 
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deontology—invite (Rawls 1955). We can critique the practice itself from whatever 
theoretical vantage point we find most compelling. We can also question which practice 
applies, or ought to apply, to our present circumstance. What we cannot do, on Rawls’s 
view, is critique the applicability of the rules from a standpoint located within the practice 
itself. We may debate what just war theory should prescribe in circumstances of war and 
whether this really is a circumstance of war. But as soldiers, we do what the code of 
soldiers prescribes.   
In the case of targeted killing via drones, the two ethics, the JWE and LEE, both 
offer themselves as potential guides. The JWE, as enshrined in international humanitarian 
law, requires that military actions respect the following principles: (1) only combatants are 
legitimate intended targets in military operations; (2) there must be reasonable certainty in 
distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants when carrying out attacks against 
combatants; (3) the force used against combatants must be proportional to the threat; and 
(4) the military advantage gained from an attack must outweigh any unintended harm that 
the attack inflicts on civilians (Melzer 2008a and 2008b, 243-419; Walzer 2000, 127-222). 
This ethic does not place an outright prohibition on knowingly causing noncombatant 
casualties, but emphasizes basic protections for noncombatants and seeks to minimize harm 
to them. 
The LEE, as reflected in international human rights law, serves as an alternative 
moral framework for evaluating drone strikes outside traditional combat contexts. In 
contrast to the JWE, the LEE puts forward the following more stringent criteria governing 
the use of force: (1) only imminent threats to life permit the use of lethal force; (2) there 
must be certain identification of a threat before using force against him or her; (3) lethal 
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force is justified only when nonlethal measures are not feasible for stopping a threat; and 
(4) any use of force must avoid the foreseeable risk of civilian casualties.3 The LEE 
prioritizes guaranteeing due process and the presumption of innocence to those suspected 
of wrongdoing over swift action against them. Therefore this ethic greatly restrains the use 
of lethal force, permitting it only in instances where it is absolutely necessary to stop an 
imminent threat to life (Melzer 2008b, 85-239).  
Some drone strikes constitute relatively easy cases, where it is clear which ethic 
applies to them. Contemporary militaries now employ armed drones in conventional 
warfare. In a conventional war, a military is justified in using drones against targets that do 
not present an imminent threat, as long as these operations adhere to the principles of the 
JWE. Drones may be a new technology, but there is nothing inherently unjust about the 
way they kill enemy combatants. The same criteria used to evaluate other military 
operations—such as a cruise missile strike—apply to drone strikes in conflict zones (Alston 
2010, 24; Strawser 2010, 356-58).  
There is greater moral ambiguity, however, when drone strikes against suspected 
terrorists occur in areas that are not conventional conflict zones—such as Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia—since the JWE’s more permissive rules for armed attacks would not 
ordinarily apply to these areas. The U.S. has authorized over 500 strikes in these regions 
																																																								
3 One exception to the prohibition on foreseeable civilian casualties under the LEE is those 
rare cases when civilians find themselves trapped by a criminal’s a threat—such as a 
hijacked airplane headed toward a populated area—where stopping the threat regrettably 
entails the deaths of civilians within it.  
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since 2002, as the targeted killing of suspected terrorists by drones has become an 
entrenched practice of U.S. foreign policy (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2015). How 
we morally assess the U.S. program of targeted drone strikes hinges on whether the JWE or 
LEE should guide these operations. 
The U.S. has made clear its position: the policy of targeted killings falls under the 
JWE and is consistent with international humanitarian law. According to both the Bush and 
Obama Administrations, the U.S. is engaged in an ongoing non-international armed 
conflict4 against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Congress’s 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force provides legal legitimacy for these ongoing strikes against suspected 
terrorists and extends beyond the battlefields of recognized war zones (Iraq and 
Afghanistan) to the more ambiguous cases of zones experiencing periodic conflict 
(Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia) (Brennan 2011; Department of Justice 2013; Holder 2012; 
Koh 2010; Obama 2013). Many in the international community, however, express 
skepticism toward the administration’s legal rationale for its program of targeted killings. 
In particular, critics find the U.S. government’s expansive interpretation of its current 
conflict with al-Qaeda—a conflict without geographic or obvious temporal limits—to be 
unprecedented and dangerous (Brumfield and Morgenstein 2013). 
If the LEE should govern targeted killings by the U.S. outside of traditional conflict 
zones, these strikes clearly lack legitimacy. Under the LEE, targeted killing is justified only 
																																																								
4 The U.S. uses the term “non-international armed conflict” to specify that it is not at war 
with another state (what would be an international conflict), but rather at war with a non-
state actor. 
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in those rare cases when lethal force is necessary to incapacitate an imminent threat to life, 
and never as a punitive response (Alston 2010, 11; Melzer 2008b, 423). U.S. targeted 
killings by drone often fall short of the LEE’s imminent threat criterion. The U.S. has 
sought to circumvent this limitation by adopting a definition of imminence that undermines 
its basic meaning. As a leaked Department of Justice legal memo shows, under U.S. policy 
“the condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack 
against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a 
specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future” 
(Department of Justice 2013, 7). A pattern of planning attacks is sufficient to qualify an 
individual as an imminent threat, not active participation in a specific future plot.   
There are similar shortcomings in the application of the LEE’s certainty standard. In 
addition to “personality strikes”—drone strikes against named terrorist suspects—the CIA 
carries out “signature strikes” against individuals based on their pattern of behavior, though 
the targets’ identity is unknown (Klaidman 2012, 40-41). Since U.S. officials do not even 
know the identities of the targets of signature strikes, this practice clearly violates the 
LEE’s requirement that officials identify a target with high certainty before authorizing a 
strike.  
In addition, the very nature of drone strikes—killing at a distance by machine—
often puts in jeopardy any hope of meeting the LEE’s requirement to use nonlethal 
measures in stopping a threat and only opt for lethal measures as a last resort. General 
James Cartwright, former vice-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, points out that a suspected 
terrorist facing a drone strike has little opportunity to surrender when there is no one on the 
ground in conjunction with a drone (McKelvey 2012). Defenders of U.S. drone policy 
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argue that strikes only occur in areas where it is impossible for troops to seize suspected 
terrorists. Yet the risk associated with putting boots on the ground, along with the 
controversy inherent in incarcerating and trying suspected terrorists on U.S. soil, creates 
strong political incentives to choose drone strikes as a first rather than last resort (Klaidman 
2012, 117-43). 
Finally and importantly, the CIA drone program violates the LEE’s—and arguably 
also the JWE’s—noncombatant protection standard by authorizing strikes that entail likely 
civilian casualties. One example occurred in North Waziristan in Pakistan on March 17, 
2011, when missiles hit a large gathering for a jirga, a tribal assembly for resolving 
disputes. Under the LEE, the presence of militants at this gathering in no way justifies the 
strike, given the large number—between 19 and 41—of foreseeable civilian casualties. 
Also, so called “double tap” strikes—a follow up strike in the same location as an initial 
strike—often kill civilians, especially first responders and mourners who rush to the scene 
of a strike (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice 
Clinic 2012, 57-62, 74). For all four of the LEE’s criteria, then, evidence suggests that the 
U.S. drone policy regularly violates these standards and even the less stringent JWE 
standards on occasion.    
Walzer’s “In-Between Zones” 
Michael Walzer in recent writings offers an alternative approach to the problem of targeted 
killing outside traditional combat zones that avoids some of the difficulties of de Wijze’s 
position but raises other concerns. For Walzer, targeted killings are justified in some 
instances, but at the same time he finds troubling the lack of restraints on the current U.S. 
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drone program. In particular, Walzer points out that the U.S. drone program as currently 
practiced regularly violates the just war principle of proportionality (Walzer 2013)—a 
concern obscured by the U.S. practice of counting all military-age males killed in a strike 
as militants unless explicit evidence proves their innocence (Becker and Shane 2012). But 
Walzer’s criticism goes beyond concerns that current U.S. drone policy is not living up to 
the principles of just war theory, suggesting instead that, for targeted killings outside of 
conflict zones, the JWE is not the proper perspective for evaluating these strikes. He does 
not object to the term “war on terror,” but argues that in such a war governments normally 
should follow the rules governing law enforcement:  
Though the risks are larger in the “war” against terror than they are in the “war” 
against crime, I believe that the first of these can be conducted—certainly we 
should try to conduct it—within the moral and constitutional constraints that 
[hold in a zone of peace]. The details of the constraints have to be negotiated, of 
course, and they are negotiated through ordinary democratic processes. And it is 
entirely legitimate that sometimes they will be less restrictive with regard to 
what the police can do and sometimes more so. But the basic principles of 
morality and constitutionalism should be defended, even in hard times. (2007, 
481)  
Here Walzer gestures at a legal and moral framework for evaluating antiterrorism activities 
such as targeted killings that closely follows the LEE in many respects but could deviate 
from it in particular instances. 
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When Walzer specifically discusses the practice of targeted killings of suspected 
terrorists (2006; 2007; 2013), he never sets out a systematic framework for evaluating 
targeted killings outside of a war zone. Walzer at times expresses wariness about the 
potential hazards of developing a new framework distinct from either the LEE or JWE 
(2007, 483). But together his recommendations appear to suggest that conditions in areas 
such as Pakistan and Yemen do require applying a novel moral and legal framework that 
synthesizes these two existing ethics governing the legitimate use of force.  
To reconstruct Walzer’s proposal, we begin by examining what he believes is an 
instance of a justified targeted killing. He approvingly cites a strike against al-Qaeda 
militants in the desert of Yemen in 2002.5 This strike, according to Walzer, occurred in a 
context that does not fit neatly into either a war zone or a zone of peace: “Yemen lies 
somewhere between Afghanistan and Philadelphia. It is not a zone of war where armies 
fight, and it is not a zone of peace where the police do their work. The state’s writ does not 
run in the desert of South Yemen” (2007, 481). Walzer appeals to the fact that certain 
presumptive features underlying the LEE do not apply to “in-between zones” such as 
Yemen. For instance, in the strike Walzer cites, the Yemeni government had previously 
tried to capture the militants, and it was only when these efforts failed that the U.S. resorted 
																																																								
5 In separate articles, Walzer gives slightly different details to describe what appears to be 
the same strike (2006, 10; 2007, 480). Walzer likely is referencing the first U.S. targeted 
killing by a drone outside a declared war zone, in which a CIA drone killed six people 
traveling by car in the desert in Yemen on November 3, 2002. Among the dead was al-
Qaeda leader Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi (Melzer 2008b, 439).  
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to a targeted killing (2007, 481).6 When police work fails to stop those actively engaged in 
terrorist activities, Walzer implies, Special Forces are justified in adopting measures more 
in line with just war principles (2007, 483).  
The example from Yemen shows that, under Walzer’s proposed ethic for in-
between zones, targets need not constitute an imminent threat to justify a strike. Walzer 
cites no evidence that the targets in Yemen posed an imminent threat in the sense that we 
normally understand “imminent”—“close at hand in its incidence; coming on shortly” 
(Oxford English Dictionary). The targets’ suspected involvement in terrorist activities 
could qualify them as imminent threats according to the Department of Justice’s 
understanding of the term, which explicitly does not “require … clear evidence that a 
specific attack … will take place in the immediate future” (Department of Justice 2013). 
But this definition, by dropping the requirement of immediacy, takes us far afield from 
traditional understandings of imminence. If Walzer were to retain the requirement that 
threats must be truly imminent to justify strikes in the in-between zones, he would have to 
point to a specific immediate attack disrupted by the strike in Yemen. Instead, he justifies 
the strike on the grounds that attempts to capture the targets proved infeasible. Walzer also 
suggests relaxing, within these in-between zones, the LEE’s strict requirement for nonlethal 
force whenever feasible—especially in cases where pursuing nonlethal options would put 
Special Forces in greater danger. 																																																								
6 For the purpose of reconstructing Walzer’s position, we do not question his account of the 
facts of the 2002 CIA strike in Yemen. It is important to point out, however, that the 
example is messier than Walzer implies. This strike, carried out without consulting 
domestic law enforcement, killed a U.S. citizen, Kemal Darwish (Woods 2012).  
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Though Walzer suggests some targeting criteria for the in-between zones similar to 
those governing the use of force in war, he emphasizes that protections for noncombatants 
in these zones remain similar to those applying in a zone of peace. Specifically, Walzer 
proposes two limits on the practice of targeted killing for in-between zones that are more 
demanding than what the JWE requires. First, he states, we must attain a higher standard of 
certainty than required under the JWE: to perform a targeted killing in an in-between zone, 
we must “be as sure as we can be, without judge or jury, that the people we are aiming at 
are really Al Qaeda militants or, more generally, that they are engaged in planning and 
carrying out terrorist attacks.” Second, Walzer claims, the noncombatant protection 
requirement is also strengthened: “We have to be as sure as we can be that we are able to 
hit the targeted person without killing innocent people in his (or her) vicinity” (2006, 11). 
To stop an imminent threat in an in-between zone, Walzer reluctantly concedes that 
noncombatant casualties may be permissible, but cautions that crossing this line easily can 
lead to brutality that cannot be justified (2007, 483-84).  
Thus, Walzer sets forth targeting criteria for in-between zones that combine 
principles from the JWE and LEE. With respect to (1) legitimate targets, only individuals 
actively engaged in terror activities count as legitimate targets in the in-between zones (a 
standard closer to the JWE requirements since the target does not need to be an imminent 
threat). With respect to (2) certainty, there must be certain identification of a threat before 
using force against him or her (corresponding to the LEE requirement). Regarding (3) the 
permissible degree of force, the force used against suspected terrorists must be proportional 
to the threat (the requirement under the JWE). Finally, in terms of (4) risk to non-
combatants, any use of force must avoid the foreseeable risk of civilian casualties, except 
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in emergencies (a slightly relaxed variation on the LEE standard). Table 11.1 shows how 
Walzer’s in-between zone proposal compares with the requirements of the JWE and LEE.  
Table 11.1 Comparison of the Criteria Governing the Use of Force  
 Just War                   
(War Zone) 
Law Enforcement  
(Zone of Peace) 
Walzer’s Proposal     
(In-Between Zone) 
 
Legitimate Targets 
 
Combatants Imminent threats only 
Individuals actively 
engaged in terrorist 
activities but not 
necessarily imminent 
threats 
Certainty 
Reasonable certainty 
in distinguishing 
combatants from 
noncombatants 
Certain ID of Threat Certain ID of Threat 
Degree of Force Proportionality 
Always nonlethal 
measures, except 
when not feasible 
Proportionality 
Risk to Noncombatants 
Principle of double 
effect limits the 
acceptable risk of 
non-combatant 
casualties 
Avoid the foreseeable 
risk of noncombatant 
casualties 
Avoid the foreseeable 
risk of noncombatant 
casualties (except in 
emergencies) 
Note: Shading denotes which criteria in Walzer’s proposal correspond with the just war 
ethic and which correspond with the law enforcement ethic. 
On its surface, Walzer’s proposal appears to offer a sensible compromise. For in-
between zones where U.S. drone strikes are common, Walzer recommends that we 
“maneuver between our conception of combat and our conception of police work, between 
international conflict and domestic crime, between zones of war and peace” (2006, 12). 
This compromise, however, proves to be more far-reaching than it seems. In offering this 
compromise, Walzer does not merely critique U.S. officials for incorrectly applying 
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existing principles governing the use of force. He further suggests that the principles of the 
JWE and LEE are inadequate to provide guidance on the proper use of force against 
suspected terrorists. In other words, concern over the U.S. practice of targeted killings 
stems partly from the need to define a new practice altogether—the use of force in the in-
between zones—with its own distinct rules. There is no category in international 
humanitarian law or international human rights law corresponding to the in-between zones 
that Walzer discusses. International law prohibits the targeted killing of a non-imminent 
threat outside of a war zone, for example, whereas Walzer’s proposal permits such action 
in certain instances. Walzer’s compromise, then, requires carving out a new theoretical 
category.  
Admittedly, the two ethical traditions governing the use of force are not set in stone: 
like any practices, their rules and norms have changed over time.7 Indeed, Avery Plaw and 
João Reis in this volume make the case that international norms regarding targeting killing 
currently may be undergoing a transformation. The temptation for creating a third category 
is understandable, since disanalogies between the domestic context and the more conflict-
ridden territories Walzer refers to are not negligible. Domestic terrorism occurs in a context 
where the rule of law is strong, which fosters an environment favorable for law 
enforcement working to stop terrorist activities. The planning, preparation, and execution 
of global terrorism, however, often take place in distant locations where the reach of 
domestic law enforcement is weak. Success in countering international terrorism therefore 
depends on the ability of domestic law enforcement agencies to cooperate with their 																																																								
7 For example, originally the rules of warfare required submarines to surface before they 
could attack, but these rules have since been abandoned (Yoder 1996, 51-52). 
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counterparts overseas, who may be ineffective or unwilling to assist. When law 
enforcement finds itself powerless to act in such instances, this challenge might be thought 
to justify relaxing the restrictions imposed by the LEE and adopting the alternate criteria 
suggested by Walzer for in-between zones.  
Yet it is important to balance this perceived need for a new “in-between ethic” with 
a sober understanding of the implications of adopting it. Walzer’s proposal would weaken 
the (theoretical) protections against force enjoyed by civilians and suspects in areas that, 
under the current dichotomous framework, generally are characterized as non-conflict 
zones. Perhaps a partial step toward the JWE is better than holding onto the LEE when it 
proves impotent to deliver its promises of security. Daniel Brunstetter and John Emery in 
this volume propose such a partial step, which places specific restraints on the use of force 
that go beyond Walzer’s account of in-between zones. But it is important to remember that, 
even as the JWE places constraints on the devastating force brought to bear by war, within 
these constraints its effects on human beings remain no less devastating. For this reason, 
any conceptual step toward expanding the zone of war is to be accepted only with 
considerable caution.    
The key step in Walzer’s argument comes in drawing the conclusion that, when law 
enforcement’s efforts are stymied, the LEE’s moral force no longer holds, opening the door 
to systematically permitting lethal force as a response to foreign terrorism in contexts 
where it would ordinarily be forbidden. The problems with this conclusion can be seen by 
considering an analogy with domestic terrorism. In the domestic context, where the LEE 
clearly applies, there is a strict prohibition against police exercising lethal force as a 
punitive response to someone suspected of terrorism. In the absence of an identifiable 
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imminent threat, the use of lethal force by the police strikes us as unwarranted. Even if 
police have an opportunity to exact punitive measures directly against a suspect, we instead 
require them to follow the law, take the suspect into custody, and let the judicial process 
take its course. This conclusion still holds in cases where we have doubts that the justice 
system can be trusted to succeed in its objectives. For instance, suppose all the evidence 
points to the guilt of a suspected domestic terrorist, yet it is known that she is likely to get 
off on a technicality or never be brought to trial because certain witnesses are too fearful to 
testify. This scenario is not far-fetched, especially given the history of domestic terrorist 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan that used violence and intimidation to operate with impunity 
in the Jim Crow era, when acts of domestic terrorism (e.g., lynchings) occurred with far 
greater frequency than today (Equal Justice Initiative 2015). Despite such failures in the 
justice system, we remain wary of discarding the LEE to allow lethal force to punish past 
actions, due to its risk of further escalating violence. 
For these reasons, we resist Walzer’s implication that in-between zones require a 
new ethic distinct from the LEE or JWE (see Daphne Eviatar’s chapter in this volume, 
which takes a similar position). Certainly, there is undeniable value in Walzer’s analysis of 
these cases, for it brings into focus a set of challenges arising outside traditional war zones 
that may pose peculiar moral quandaries for those committed to following the prescriptions 
of the LEE and JWE. Where terrorism makes peace precarious, the impetus is greatest to 
resort to lethal force in situations that fall short of satisfying the criteria demanded by the 
LEE. The danger in choosing this path, however, lies in its broader impact on communities 
and noncombatants. Systematically relaxing the restraints on the use of force against 
suspected terrorists puts not only these suspects at greater risk, but also the communities of 
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innocent men, women, and children where they reside. In fact, such an approach to in-
between zones has the effect of empowering terrorists to bring conditions approaching war 
wherever they go, even areas where, though the rule of law may be less than ideal, many of 
the characteristics of domestic stability and peace still obtain.  
It is precisely this consequence of the U.S.’s choice to define its counterterrorism 
efforts against al-Qaeda and its affiliates as a war without geographic limits that raises 
concerns. As Steven Ratner argues, by understanding this conflict as a global war that 
extends wherever al-Qaeda is found, the U.S. pursues a policy that makes in-between zones 
both more vulnerable and more prevalent (2007, 272). Indeed, these areas have suffered the 
most under the CIA covert drone program and, unsurprisingly, strikes in these areas have 
proven the most controversial (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic 
and Global Justice Clinic 2012). Walzer’s proposal does seek to place limits on the CIA 
program that are currently absent. But the implications of his proposal still tend to weaken 
noncombatant protections in ways that are difficult to justify categorically, given the strong 
resemblance that in-between zones continue to share with non-war zones.  
Across a variety of contexts, there should be a strong presumption to hold onto the 
protections of the LEE. The mere presence of a dangerous individual domestically does not 
compel us to abandon the LEE, nor should this dynamic alone lead to a different 
conclusion for a far away land. The principles of jus ad bellum articulate demanding 
criteria that must be met before ever bringing war into a community (Johnson 1999, 27-70; 
Walzer 2000, 51-124; Yoder 1996, 71-80, 147-56). In particular, the principle of 
proportionality demands that any analysis of the expected harms and benefits of going to 
war cannot give privileged consideration to one’s fellow civilians, but must give equal 
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weight to foreign civilians whom the war could harm.8 Due to the often-disastrous effects 
of war on civilians and the tendency of violence to escalate, the proportionality requirement 
sets a high bar to justify war. Furthermore, even if this bar is met, it is a mistake to claim 
that, for entities as diverse and amorphous as terrorist organizations, a nation can make a 
broad proclamation of war against them once and then pursue war wherever these 
organizations are found. This perspective casts away important restraints on war and invites 
an expansive conflict. Decisions regarding war must be sensitive to conditions on the 
ground and made separately for distinct locales, on a case-by-case basis. Any attempt to 
systematically discard the LEE wherever the challenge of terrorism arises misses this 
critical point.   
The LEE places more stringent restrictions on targeted killings and the use of force 
generally than the JWE, but it is not impotent in the face of terror and possesses resources 
for addressing it. Within Walzer’s in-between zones, we observe that it is more likely that 
the third condition for a targeted killing—infeasibility of nonlethal measures—will be met 
than in standard domestic contexts because law enforcement is weak in such areas. Yet this 
observation by itself does not imply a weakening of the LEE’s normative force. On the 
contrary, the LEE still holds for in-between zones and officials retain a prima facie 
obligation to pursue nonlethal responses whenever such measures have a reasonable 
prospect of success. The implication of the purported distinction between zones of peace 
and in-between zones is in reality much more modest: if justified targeted killings of 
suspected terrorists become somewhat more plausible for in-between zones, that is only 																																																								
8 A spokesman for the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops makes exactly this point when 
questioning the legitimacy of the current U.S. program of targeted killing (Pates 2013). 
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because the lack of effective law enforcement in these areas may tend to make capture and 
other nonlethal responses to imminent terrorist threats less feasible. 
Potential Dirty Hands Dilemmas Raised by Drones and Terrorism 
Our approach, therefore, begins by adopting the standpoint of the relevant ethic (JWE or 
LEE, depending on the context) as a starting point, and only then engage in adaptations of 
its strictures based on specific features of the situation at hand. Here the traditional concept 
of dirty hands again becomes relevant, particularly in emergencies where the morally 
obligatory features of the applicable ethic might potentially be overridden by competing 
consequentialist considerations. In this section, we focus on examples of what we take to 
be actual dirty-handed dilemmas, in order to highlight the truly hard cases that could arise 
when considering the targeted killing of a suspected terrorist. These examples offer a sharp 
contrast to the systematic abuses that often result from categorical exemptions to the LEE 
or JWE.  
The complexity of terrorism makes it impossible to put forth a comprehensive list 
of potential dirty-handed actions related to the practice of targeted killings outside 
traditional combat zones. Nevertheless, below we review four brief hypothetical scenarios 
set in one of Walzer’s in-between zones. In each example, one of the standard criteria for a 
targeted killing under what would normally be the default ethic outside traditional combat 
zones (the LEE) is not met. By eliminating one of the ordinarily required conditions of the 
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LEE while leaving the other three intact, we can observe the moral stakes in each scenario 
more systematically.9  
Example 1: Condition Requiring Presence of an Imminent Threat is Not Met  
A certain terrorist suspect is a charismatic leader with a history of enlisting new recruits 
and inspiring attacks against civilians—trends expected to continue as long as he remains 
in his leadership role. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the terrorist suspect is 
currently participating in a specific plot endangering civilian lives. Capturing the leader 
through traditional law enforcement methods has proven impossible, which tempts officials 
to authorize a targeted strike against the leader based on his past actions and likelihood of 
similar future actions. Clearly, a strike in such a situation runs afoul of the criteria set forth 
by the LEE, which requires an imminent threat, not past actions, to justify a targeted 
killing. But because of the terrorist suspect’s unique authority, some officials argue that 
they need to put aside the imminent threat requirement in this instance. Killing this 
																																																								
9 Some counterterrorism actions share features of the hypothetical scenarios outlined, and 
in particular there are potential parallels between the first scenario and the killing of Osama 
bin Laden. Nevertheless, we deliberately use hypothetical dirty hands dilemmas, rather 
than real life examples, due to the secrecy surrounding most targeted killings by drones. 
Since key, morally relevant details often are missing in these cases, using them as examples 
presents difficulties for illustrating the dirty hands dilemma. We thus rely on hypothetical 
examples to show with greater precision different manifestations of the dirty hands 
dilemma that targeted killings can take.  
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individual will significantly damage the terrorist organization’s capabilities and limit its 
ability to carry out future attacks. 
Example 2: Condition Requiring Certainty of Target’s Identity is Not Met  
An obscure terrorist group succeeds in carrying out several devastating attacks on civilians, 
and fear grips the country that more attacks are coming. The attacks catch intelligence 
officials off guard. Because officials do not have a long history of tracking this group, they 
lack in-depth knowledge of its members and operations. Officials succeed in piecing 
together parts of this terrorist network, but significant gaps in their knowledge remain. 
Based on chatter they have heard, intelligence officials believe with a high degree of 
certainty that more attacks are planned. Yet intelligence officials are less certain about the 
identity of the network’s leaders and who should be priority targets in efforts to stop 
another attack. Given this imperfect information, any strikes would carry the significant 
risk of killing individuals unaffiliated with the terrorist network or who occupy relatively 
minor roles within it. Officials must decide whether the imminence and scale of the threat 
warrants relaxing the certainty requirement in this instance. 
Example 3: Condition Requiring the Necessity of Lethal Force is Not Met  
Intelligence officials learn that a terrorist cell in a remote region is close to making 
operational a potentially devastating plot directed at civilians in a large city. The country 
where this terrorist cell resides wants to stop them just as much as the U.S. In fact, the U.S. 
has participated with this country on joint operations to capture other suspected terrorists in 
its network. But the two countries have carried out these operations with varying degrees of 
success. Some operations have resulted in the successful capture of terrorist suspects. Other 
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operations, however, have been bloody and cost both countries lives. Moreover, the success 
of this terrorist group in repelling external forces has helped its legend grow and brought in 
more recruits. Attempting to capture members of this terrorist cell through nonlethal means 
is an option, but based on past experiences some officials argue that targeted strikes are 
necessary to ensure that the plot is stopped, as well as to reduce projected military 
casualties and to preclude costly prestige and recruitment gains by the terrorist group. 
Example 4: Condition Prohibiting Foreseen Civilian Casualties is Not Met  
For weeks, officials have been carrying out surveillance on a terrorist suspect. Officials 
have established that he is planning a chemical weapons attack in a populated area. Due to 
various factors, capturing the suspect proves impossible in his current location. The attack 
is imminent, so officials want to move forward with a strike. Members of the suspect’s 
family are always near him, however. Those observing the suspect have tried to find an 
opportunity to strike when other family members are not in the immediate vicinity, but 
such an opportunity has yet to arise. Officials have to make a decision: carry out the 
targeted killing, which almost certainly will cause the death of noncombatant family 
members of the terrorist suspect, or allow the terrorist plot to proceed, which could result in 
high numbers of civilian casualties. 
Whether a targeted killing in any of the above scenarios would be justified depends 
on the precise nature of the threat and the harm caused by forgoing a strike when not all the 
necessary conditions are met. Arguably the list of plausible cases of dirty hands could 
include examples when two or more conditions of the controlling ethic do not obtain, but as 
more conditions are not met, the required justification for permitting the legitimate use of 
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lethal force becomes increasingly more demanding. For all dilemmas of dirty hands, the 
moral burden of proof rests with those employing violence to show that emergency 
circumstances compelled them to break the rules that normally bind them. The public has 
good reason to be skeptical of a dirty hands justification for a targeted killing, given how 
often governments offer dubious post hoc justifications for violations of moral rules. In any 
evaluation of dirty hands situations, it is critical to remember that by their nature such 
dilemmas ordinarily arise in emergency contexts. If advocates of a policy repeatedly have 
to resort to dirty hands arguments to defend implementation of it, that is a strong prima 
facie reason to suspect the policy. Dirty hands justifications may sometimes succeed in 
preserving the legitimacy of actions that normally would constitute ethical violations, but 
such justifications never can redeem an ongoing policy that routinely disregards basic 
moral principles. 
Drones and Accountability 
In Walzer’s original essay on dirty hands, he emphasizes the dangers of political actors 
stepping outside established moral frameworks to justify their actions. When a political 
actor breaks a moral rule, the worry is that she will become increasingly accustomed to 
wrongdoing. If nothing checks this behavior, the political actor may embrace the mindset 
that, in service of the greater good, she can break moral rules with impunity. Because of 
this concern, Walzer suggests that political leaders who dirty their hands should face 
punishment. Walzer himself recognizes the challenges of implementing this proposal, but it 
conveys the idea that we must hold accountable leaders who dirty their hands for the public 
good (1973, 80-81). An ethical leader embraces this aspect of the dirty hands situation: she 
recognizes the legitimacy and binding nature of her moral and legal responsibilities, even 
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as outside factors force her to regrettably forsake them. By contrast, a political system that 
lacks specific mechanisms for accountability invites political actors to permanently claim 
and abuse emergency powers. That worry is particularly acute in the case of targeted 
killings. It is a short journey between the practice of targeted killings and government 
assuming the power to assassinate at will. It therefore is wise to be wary of attempts to 
legitimize an expansive program of targeted killings.  
Political incentives, however, encourage expanding rather than limiting the U.S. 
practice of targeting killings. Current U.S. drone policy plays well in the court of domestic 
public opinion (unsurprisingly, U.S. drone strikes are less popular abroad) (Pew 2014). 
Equally important, this military technology allows the U.S. to wage war against suspected 
terrorists while avoiding what usually is an inevitable consequence of war—casualties 
among one’s own soldiers. The actual human costs of drone strikes are easier for the media 
and public to ignore. From the perspective of electoral politics, then, there is little reason 
for politicians to curb drone strikes: successful strikes advance politicians’ ambitions, while 
inaccurate strikes carry little risk of backlash.10  
Is it possible to restrict targeted killings outside of war only to cases that pose an 
imminent threat to human life? Admittedly, we are only a few years into the experiment of 
using drone technology for targeted killings, but thus far the evidence casts strong doubts 
																																																								
10 Illustrating this point is the reported obsession with drone strikes of Rahm Emanuel as 
Obama’s chief of staff. Anxious to learn of and publicize successful strikes, Emanuel 
recognized the political upsides of the drone program for the president (Klaidman 2012, 
121-22). 
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on government’s ability to use this power in a way that avoids the excesses to which it is 
prone. Protocols for the current U.S. drone program are not even public. For the 
foreseeable future, no plausible scenario exists whereby the strikes themselves might be 
subject to any form of retrospective public review.11 This lack of accountability has led to 
an expanded U.S. policy of targeted strikes that frequently kills and maims noncombatants 
and instills an atmosphere of fear in areas where strikes are most common. One Pakistani 
man, who lost his legs in a drone strike, poignantly describes the human toll of current U.S. 
policy: “Everyone is scared all the time. When we’re sitting together to have a meeting, 
we’re scared there might be a strike. When you can hear the drone circling in the sky, you 
think it might strike you” (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and 
Global Justice Clinic 2012, 81; see also Al-Muslimi 2013). The severe trauma experienced 
in communities impacted by drone strikes makes clear the urgent need to significantly limit 
the scope of this policy. In the absence of dramatic reforms, the inevitable conclusion 
seems to be that the capabilities drones provide are too tempting to insulate from 
systematic abuse. If that is the case, the most prudent step, suggested by Stephan 
Sonnenberg in this volume, may be a broad policy restricting the use of drones for targeted 
killings to genuine combat zones. 
 																																																								
11 The U.S. Senate rejected a modest proposal to require the President to make public each 
year the number of people killed and injured in U.S. targeted killing operations (Mazzetti 
2014). 
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Conclusion 
Ethical analysis invites us to use our imaginations. It tends to draw our attention away from 
ordinary experience and toward the frontier of the unknown, to fix our gaze on situational 
outliers and eccentric hypothetical scenarios. In doing so, ethical analysis attunes us to 
recognize complexities in our moral experience that we might otherwise overlook. The 
politician dirtying her hands is such a case. But it is important when exploring these 
frontiers that we do not forget the distance we have traveled to arrive at them; that we do 
not import the ethic of the frontier to a context where it does not apply. As we have seen, 
targeted killing in the context of counterterrorism may present genuine dirty hands 
dilemmas. But this possibility in particular instances is insufficient to justify a policy that 
regularly violates fundamental moral and legal principles. It is hard not to reach the 
conclusion that dirty hands justifications for the U.S. drone program often serve as post hoc 
rationalizations for policies of dubious ethical standing. 
Terrorism poses a special problem for ethical analysis because it seeks to import 
some of the conditions of guerilla or concealed warfare into otherwise peaceful contexts. 
The appropriate ethic for responding to terrorism where we encounter it directly is the ethic 
of war: but we rarely confront it directly, for it conceals itself. Its obscene purpose is to 
subdue us to a life of flinching at the mere shadows of its terrors. If it induces us to lash out 
indiscriminately in response, to transpose the ethic of war to times and places of peace, all 
the better: that will admirably suit its end. And all the while, if it ever catches us 
unprepared, it gains the chance to start the whole dreadful cycle once more. 
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How to respond to terrorism is a matter of genuine ethical difficulty, and the notion 
of dirty hands captures its family resemblance with other familiar moral challenges that 
pervade public life. But we must not let these genuine challenges eradicate the ethical 
progress we have made. The codes of conduct restricting violence in the enforcement of 
law and in war reflect an ethical frontier never too far away, especially in counterterrorism 
efforts that often blur the lines between zones of war and peace. But even if terrorism is 
war made more insidious through concealment, it is still no more than war. If we know the 
ethic appropriate to war, terrorism cannot give us reasons to enact a policy that 
systematically goes beyond that frontier ethic. Indeed, it will frequently require us to take 
one or more steps back from that ethic of extremes, to rely on the ethic of law enforcement, 
until such time as war itself is indisputably at hand. 
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